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ABSTRACT
The long-standing debate over whether to centralize or decentralize
computing Is examined In terms of the fundamental organizational and economic
factors at stake. The traditional debate Is examined and found to focus
predominantly on Issues of efficiency vs. effectiveness, with solutions based
on a rationalistic strategy of optimizing In this tradeoff. A more behavlor-
allstic assessment suggests that the driving Issues In the debate are the
politics of organization and resources, centering on the Issue of control.
The economics of computing deployment decisions Is presented as an Important
Issue, but one that often serves as a field of argument that Is based on more
political concerns. The current situation facing managers of computing,
given the advent of small and comparatively Inexpensive computers. Is examined
In detail, and a set of management options for dealing with this persistent
Issue Is presented.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Managers of computing in organizations have confronted decisions about
centralizing or decentralizing computing ever since the computer proved to be
more than just another piece of office equipment. The debate about whether
or not to centralize computing has flourished for nearly twenty years in the
community of information systems research and practice [17,29,55,56,101,107,
149]. The quest in the debate has been to determine the appropriate arrange
ment for the deployment of computing resources in organizations, given the
needs of computing users and the desires of management to control the costs
and uses of computing. The universally "appropriate" arrangement has never
been found. Nevertheless, admonitions about how to deal with the question
have continued to abound, usually prompted by technological changes that
have altered the perceived efficiencies of different arrangements [3.12.
23,31,32].
As a result of such changes, managers have been faced with a continually
changing terrain in which to make centralization vs. decentralization deci
sions. Managers are now being confronted with predictions about the "comput
ing arrangement of the future" ranging from the conservative to the revolu
tionary: from the deployment of small, special-purpose computers in user
departments, to networked distributed systems deployed throughout the organi
zations, and even to remote intelligent terminals in employees' homes enabling
the workforce to "telecommute" instead of coming in to the office [12,14,
15,34,37,38,40,51,52,53,54,55,60,68,74,83,84,88,113,115,126]. Curiously, the
tables have turned, and some have begun to argue that a computer is just
another piece of office equipment, like a telephone or typewriter, inexpensive
and available to all.
This paper first places the issue of centralization and decentralization
in perspective, providing a working definition of the concepts and outlining
the basic pros and cons of each. It then discusses the traditional debate
over centralized vs. decentralized computing, focusing on the customary
assessment of "tradeoffs" between efficiency and effectiveness in choosing
which policy to follow. This is followed by a detailed examination of the
problems with this traditional perspective, concentrating on the critical
importance of political and organizational factors in the debate, and noting
the ways in which simple economic analyses of the alternatives can result in
misleading conclusions. This examination reveals that control is the most
important issue in centralization/decentralization decisions, and that other
issues must be seen in light of this fact. The paper concludes with an
examination of the basic options for management in dealing with the centrali
zation vs. decentralization issue, given the political and economic factors
that underlie the debate.2
2. THE ISSUE IN PERSPECTIVE
2.1 A Working Definition
Most coneeptualizations of centralization and decentralization rely on
some concept of distance [57,58,120]: distance between plant locations;
distance between different levels of organizational hierarchy or operations
within an organization; the physical or organizational distance between
where decisions are made and where they are enacted.3 The centralization/
decentralization issue generally takes one of three forms.
Centralization vs. decentralization of control concerns the locus
of decision making activity in the organization [1,22,54,75,87,89,90,101,102,
103,131,132,133,134,135]. Centralization implies the concentration of deci
sion making power in a single person or small group; decentralization implies
that decisions are made at various levels in the organizational heirarchy.
Centralization vs. decentralization of physical location concerns where
operations and responsibilities are located in physical space. Centralized
physical location would have all facilities co-located; decentralizated
location would spread facilities around the region or the county, or even
internationally. Centralization vs. decentralization of function refers to
the position of an activity or responsibility within thi oFganization's
structure. For example, centralized accounting and control would require
all departments and units to report financial data to a single unit, whereas
decentralization might establish a number of profit and loss centers with
their own accounting activities and require that only aggregated data be
passed up to the corporate headquarters.
2.2 Pros and Cons of the Alternatives
Centralization of control tends to preserve top management prerogatives
in most decisions; decentralization of control allows lower-level managers
discretion in choosing among decision options [22,23,35,87,89,102]. The
former strategy can help insure continuity in organizational operations, but
it can be disadvantageous because it increases the distance between the level
where decisions are made and where they are put into action. If decisions
are misguided due to poor top-level understanding of the problem, or are
subverted due to poor enforcement at the lower levels, centralization can be
disadvantageous. Decentralization of control helps force lower level managers
to take responsibility for their decisions, thereby possibly improving their
performance. It also encourages lower level managers to exploit innovative
opportunities that help improve unit-level performance. Decentralization
of control can create problems if lower-level managers are incompetent, are
not appropriately held to account for their decisions, or if their decisions
result in problems for other organization units or for higher management.
The main advantages of centralizing physical location result from capi
talizing on economies of scale and preservation of organizational integrity
in operations. Economies of scale arise from exploiting the full potential
of technologies that cause output to increase more rapidly than costs. The
costs of duplicating overhead and facilities can be avoided, and organiza
tional protocols are easier to enforce. However, these advantages can be
outweighed by other costs for organizational communications (including
travel costs), transportation of raw materials and finished goods, and main
taining close ties to customers and clients. In special cases, such as
military deployment or location of fire stations, the need for rapid response
to unexpected-situations also dictates the need for physical decentralization.
Centralizing organizational functions can help keep performance in line
with organizational protocols and standards, smooth workflow on highly dis
crete tasks, constrain labor cost escalation by reducing the need for new
hires, and allow close monitoring and adjustment of work activities to better
correspond with overall organizational operations. Decentralization of func
tions is advantageous in cases where the functions being performed require
close cooperation among other units, where the tasks being done require great
worker discretion and less central guidance, or vAiere regular interaction
with members of other organizational units would require too much "commuting"
by individuals, either from the centralized functional department to the
other departments, or vice versa.
The basic questions of centralization and decentralization revolve
around tailoring organizational arrangements to meet the constraints of
organizational size, the nature of the technology involved in organizational
operations, and the needs of organizational clients and customers [102].
These differences set the stage for all discussions of centralization and
decentralization decisions. The objective of managers in choosing appropriate
organizational arrangements is to choose the appropriate arrangement to match
the organization's particular requirements to the alternatives available.
3. CENTRALIZATION VS. DECENTRALIZATION OF COMPUTING: THE TRADITIONAL DEBATE
The same considerations govern computing arraingements. Prevailing
organizational structures will often dictate the broad outlines of compu
ting systems arrangements [1,11,15,16,31,32,40,43,44,52,57,80,82,86,96,98,
104,112,113,117,124,127,138]. Organizations with centralized control and/or
location of most activities are likely to have the same arrangements for com
puting. Yet, prevailing organizational arrangements do not always determine
computing arrangements. Computing policies are often made without respect
to other organizational practices, or even in efforts to change those practi
ces [28,23,64,65,71,81,82,113,131,149]. The traditional debate over compu
ting centralization and decentralization has often treated computing as a
unique organizational resource in making policies about these alternatives.
The most common arguments in favor of centralizing computing have focused
on the centralization of location and function: that is, v^ether to have com
puting facilities and/or service centralized or decentralized [6,7,31,32,43,
44,56,123,126,127]. To many managers, the basic advantages of consolidation
could only be overcome when problems of geographic dispersal and increasing
size of operations eventually forced decentralization. The advantages of
hardware centralization seemed especially compelling given "Grosch's Law":
that computing power could be obtained at a function equal to the square of
the cost of the computer [46,47,48,49,96]. This law, borne out in subsequent
tests [20,97,121,123], offered a powerful incentive to centralize facilities.
This usually meant not only complete centralization of machines, but of
computing control and functions as well. Until the late 1970s, the authors
of articles on computing centralization were nearly unanimous in the conclu
sion that, irrespective of its other impacts, centralization saves money[7,43,44,107,118,110,122,126,136,142].
Arguments favoring decentralization tended not to focus on economies,
but on claims of improved computing service for users [31,32,43,44,57].
The question of use centered on control over use of the technology and physical
access to computing facilities. A common admonition in the literature on
location was that the department which controls computing would dominate its
use and subordinate the users of other departments [6,7].^ Users who could
not get access to the technology would not use the technology. If the technol
ogy were decentralized, users would have access and would use it more. The
closer the users' proximity to the control and location of the technology,
and to the ability to directly interact with those who provide the service,
the greater the use they would make of the technology. Similarly, decentrali
zation would result in greater user satisfaction with computing. By giving
users control or possession of the technology and computing staff, users
would be able to utilize the technology more efficiently and effectively
than under centralized conditions, thereby increasing their satisfaction
[6,7,16,57].
The arguments over centralization and decentralization of computing have
therefore tended to be cast as "tradeoff" debates, in which the organizational
advantages of centralized control, uniform operations, and economies of scale
have been pitted against user department needs for ready access to computing
and opportunity for fitting computing capabilities to department requirements
[31,32,57,58,142]. The tradeoff has often been reduced to "efficiency" vs.
"effectiveness" [57,58]. The proponents of centralization have argued that
centralized computing ensures efficiency, and permits effective service to
users as long as good communications are maintained between the central com
puting service providers and the users. Centralization tends to be oriented
toward top-down control: control of costs for computing, control of uses of
computing, and in some cases control over information being processed. The
proponents of decentralization have argued that properly developed, decentral
ized computing arrangements are profitable, even if somewhat more costly,
because they improve the productivity of computer use by those v^o use the
technology in the course of conducting the organization's business. Decen
tralization tends to be oriented toward bottom-up productivity improvement:
improved exploitation of computing for departmental tasks and improved system
design to meet user needs.
The high cost of computers caused most organizations to adopt relatively
centralized computing policies, and proponents of decentralization usually
had to fight on uphill battle. The advent of smaller, less expensive compu
ters has changed the dynamics of the centralization vs. decentralization
debate. User departments can now claim that decentralization is affordable,
and maybe even less expensive than centralization. This change has stimulated
the debate and created new challenges for managers who must decide what is
to be done.
4. ORGANIZATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS IN THE DEBATE TODAY
If the new technologies do make decentralization affordable, not
decentralize? The answer is twofold. For one thing, it is not clear what
"affordable"-means. It is now possible to buy powerful computer processors
for a fraction of what equivalent machines would have cost a decade ago.
But computing requires more than computers, and the costs of computing entail
more than just the procurement of processors. Second, computing has become
increasingly important to organizational operations as applications have
grown in size, complexity, and centrality to many facets of organizational
life. Decentralization of computing often means decentralization of important
organizational activities that perhaps should not be decentralized. Tradi
tional arguments in the centralization vs. decentralization debate have under
gone change, but the fundamental questions behind the debate are more compli
cated than ever. It is necessary, therefore, to look beyond the arguments
of the traditional debate to the factors that make centralization vs. decen
tralization in computing systems such as a potent and persistent issue. This
section examines two factors that appear to be of special importance: the
politics of organization and resources; and the economic dynamics of deploy
ment decisions.
4.1 The Politics of Organization and Resources
The politics of organization and resources refers to those formal and
informal means by which decisions are made as to how different organizational
units are treated in terms of resources, influence, and autonomy [4,22,26,28,
35,72,75,82,87,90,92,102,137,141]. Often the roles taken by specific organi
zational units dictate what share of organizational power and resources they
receive, but this is not always the case. Sometimes there is considerable
uncertainty about which roles various units should play in the "best" interests
of the organization, and decisions about such roles must be resolved by
competition and disagreement among the different interests involved.
4.1.1 Consensus vs. divergence in goal setting. The centralization vs.
decentralization debate is fueled by disagreements. Are these disagreements
over the means to accomplish goals, or over both the means and the goals?
Much of the prescriptive management literature assumes that the ends are
agreed on: that computing is a tool to be utilized in the "best" interests
of the organization [e.g., 1,5,1,30,44,83,93,94,95,98,113,117,124]. Ac
cording to this literature, the goal of computing policies is to provide
for provision of computing services at the most effective level given costs,
to maximize the organization's profitability and performance through use of
computing, and to improve information flow throughout the organization to
expedite operations and management. This goal-oriented view of computing
sees the organization as a system of interrelated tasks, staffed by employees
who are primarily concerned with maintaining and improving organizational
performance [28,65,67]. According to this rationalistic view, computing
systems are instruments (or in more elaborated settings, "environments")
that, vihen properly managed, help the organization to meet its goals, adapt
to its environment, and improve the performance of its employees.
Centralization/decentralization policy in this rationalistic context
seeks to deploy computing resources in a manner that best facilitates produc
tive use of computing and maintains managerial control over important organi
zational information. Computing is a tool that various organizational users
need in order to do their jobs effectively; the task of management is to ensure
that this tool is made available to users at the lowest cost given the appro
priate users made of it. This does not necessarily mean computing must be
provided as cheaply as possible. Factors such as geographical remoteness,
specialized user needs, or high concentrations of demand for service might
warrant costly solutions. The hallmark of a rationalistic policy for central
ization/decentralization is the attempt to balance the efficiencies and
effectiveness of various computing service arrangements given the justifiable
needs of users. "Tlie design of policy concentrates on what "ought" to be done
in line with the overall goals of the organization.
The focus on what "ought" to be done weakens the rationalistic approach
to making computing policy in actual organizations by incorrectly assuming
that the goals of various organizational actors will be coherent with the
stated goals of organizational leadership [27,28,64,65,66,67,82]. In fact,
there are important differences among factions within most large and complex
organizations that suggest the presence of conflict and disagreement over
organizational goals and the means for meeting them. A behavioralistic
view of organizations suggests that individuals value their personal opinions
and the needs of their own departments more highly than they do those of the
organization at large.5 The behavioralist view sees computing not as
a discrete tool, but as a package consisting of both technologies and the
intentions behind their use. Computing is used to further the goals of
specific organizational actors (e.g., top management, financial controllers,
data processing professionals) in ways that might or might not improve organi
zational performance or help meet organizational goals. Any disagreements
over what the goals of the organization really are will preclude agreement
on how best to use computing to meet them.
The behavioralist perspective has been conspicuously absent in the
centralization/decentralization debate, at least as far as recommendations
for policy are concerned. Disagreements over computing policies have been
interpreted from a rationalistic perspective as being due to misunderstanding
of either the facts or the goals. The rationalist solution to this problem
is fact finding through conduct of studies (e.g., cost-benefit analysis) and
goal setting or clarification through discussion (e.g. through user commit
tees) to illuminate the appropriate course of action. It is seldom suggested
that the facts are simply elusive, or that disagreements on goals are intract
able. The practical objectives become to decide what the facts are, which
is not always the same as finding them, and to decide whose goals will be
accepted as the goals, v^ich is not always the same as achieving goal congru
ence.
Despite the lack of centralization/decentralization studies embodying
the behavioralist perspective, other studies of computing suggest that this
perspective is a useful way to think about the issue [28,58,60,62,64,65,67,
70,72,82,106,116]. These studies indicate that the primary effects of compu
ting on organizations arise first from the intentions behind computing use.
and secondly, from the nature of the technology itself. Generally, computers
are adopted and Implemented in accordance with dominant organizational
interests, and in support of those interests [28]. In small, narrowly-focused
organizations, the dominant interests might include the interests of all the
actors in the-organization and computing could be applied to meet organization-
-wide goals. But such organizations are usually too small to be facing the
centralization issue. Larger, more complex organizations usually have many
and diverse social groupings, multiple organizational tasks and objectives,
and more decentralized decisionmaking structures, which makes the presence
of a single decisionmaking group that speaks for all interests unlikely [65].
Disagreements over how best to use computing are therefore endemic to such
organizations.
In organizations large enough and complex enough to be facing problems
deciding about whether to centralize or decentralize, one can expect continued
conflict and disagreement in determination of computing policies. Students of
organizational change suggest that in many complex organizations, polices are
like a pendulum that swings back and forth between centralization and decen-.
tralization [75,89,90]. Resolution of disputes will not come simply from
studying or discussing organizational goals. Facts and accepted organization
al goals are important in making computing policies, and genuine consensus
is sometimes possible, but the task of making policies for computing requires
sensitivity to the motivations behind a wider array of organizational inter
ests than those articulated by the dominant decisionmakers.
The use of a behavioralist perspective is useful in assessing the debates
about centralization and decentralization, because it provides a perspective
for interpreting where the desires to centralize or decentralize come from,
and how they can be dealt with.
4.1.2. The driving factors in the debate. From the behavioral ist per
spective, there are nine organizational factors that drive the centraliza
tion/decentralization debate in the management of computing.
1. The need to provide computing capability to all organizational
units that legitimately require such capability, in order to
exploit the potential of the technology.
2. The need to contain the capital and operations costs in provi
sion of computing services within the organization.
3. The need to ensure that special and sometimes idiosyncratic
computing needs of user departments are satisfied.
4. The need to maintain organizational integrity in operations that
are dependent on computing (i.e., avoid mismatches in operations
among departments).
5. The need to ensure that information needs of management are met.
6. The need to ensure that computing services be provided in a
reliable, professional, and technically competent manner.
7. The need to allow organizational units sufficient autonomy in
conduct of their tasks to optimize creativity and performance
at the unit level.
8.- The need among organizational units to preserve their autonomy,
and if possible, to increase the importance and influence of
their units within the larger organization.
9. The need, wherever possible, to make the work of employees
enjoyable as well as productive, including providing the oppor
tunity for employees to partake in the "entertainment value" of
computing.6
Each of these can be viewed from a rationalist perspective, with the
goals in formulation of policy being to balance each criterion against the
others so as to optimize the overall result. The problem with such an ap
proach is that the objective function itself isunclear. Depending on who
one talks to, a different set of priorities for these considerations will
emerge. Moreover, in some cases, the considerations contradict one another.
For example, the need to maintain integrity in operations across the organiza
tion can conflict with the desires of organizational units for autonomy
in how they conduct their affairs. The way in which these different factors
interact can, be seen in the following illustrative history, which briefly
recounts the evolution of policies governing administrative data processing
over the past two decades.' By keeping these factors in mind, the complexity
and persistence of the centralization/decentralization debate becomes ap
parent, and the current situation can be seen as a continuation of this
history.
4.1.3. An illustrative history. Computers were first applied to tasks
that were easily rationalized and programmed. In most organizations these
tasks were in the area of administrative data processing, such as payroll
preparation and accounting which had wel1-developed procedures and large
processing volumes. The finance/accounting unit usually performed these
tasks, and therefore could justify the need for computing. This unit
also usually had prior experience with mechanical automation of data pro
cessing through unit record machines. The location of digital computing in
the finance/accounting unit was a logical step. Capital and operations
costs could be managed through the existing decision processes within the
department,"and through the normal budgetary process whereby the department
negotiated for its share of organizational resources. The finance/ account
ing unit controlled the computing system and could tailor the system to meet
its needs. This provided autonomy in computing uses and operations. The
well established communications channels between finance/accounting and top
management facilitated upward flow of important financial information. The
finance/accounting unit's role as a staff function allowed it to justify in
creased organizational investments in computing on grounds that they would
serve the "whole organization." The newness and mystique surrounding comput
ers made the finance/accounting unit unique and special in the eyes of other
organizational units and top management. Reports printed by computers carried
authority that other reports did not, while the technical complexities of
computing could be used to buffer the finance/accounting department from
inquiries about specific reporting requirements the department imposed on
other units.® The fact that the computer "made the requirement necessary"
was a powerful argument.
This exclusive relationship between the finance/accounting unit and the
computer did not last very long. Other organizational units began to see
possible applications of the computer, and to explore the means for exploiting
the technology. The fact that computers were large, stand-alone machines
provided only two possibilities for getting computing service to new users:
acquire more computers, or make new users use the services of the finance/
accounting unit. This posed a dilemma. The high capital costs of computing
and "Grosch's Law" suggested that other users should share the finance/ac
counting computer. The finance/accounting unit's experience with computing
helped ensure that computing services would be provided in a competent manner.
And the close ties between finance/accounting and top management ensured that
top management interests would be served. However, sharing meant the new
users would lose some departmental autonomy by placing their data processing
tasks in the hands of another organizational unit. It had the disturbing
result (in the eyes of other units) of providing the finance/accounting unit
with a powerful rationale for increasing its own budget and staff, and thereby
its power and influence in the organization. New users would have to follow
the finance/accounting department's guidelines for use, and their jobs would
generally receive lower priority. Finally, to the extent that use of computing
was viewed as exciting and desirable, the finance/accounting department
maintained an exclusive hold over whatever such benefits computing provided.
The response to this dilemma was usually formulated by top management.
The high capital costs of computers required that procurement decisions
typically be approved by top managers. New computing centers were established
in organizations where geographical considerations required them, or when
other units had sufficient organizational influence to overcome the centralist
arguments of economies of scale and integrity in computing usages. But this
happened only in those organizations that had dispersed sites and/or large
and powerful subunits that could successfully defend having their own computer
center. In most organizations the centralist arguments prevailed, usually on
grounds of economies of scale. The computer center remained in the finance/
accounting department, and procedures were set up to allow other users access
to the computer for their needs.
Neither the centralized nor the decentralized strategy proved to be
perfect. Where multiple centers were established, there arose criticism of
"proliferation" of expensive computers and concerns about maintaining techni
cally-competent computing operations and meeting the needs of top management
for information. Costs for computing did indeed rise rapidly, partly due to
growing applications of the technology, and partly due to the exploitation
of the budgetary leverage computing provided to the departments that had
their own computers.^ The individual centers often pursued their own goals,
sometimes without much attention to the objectives of top management. A
professional cadre of data processing specialists emerged that was able to
consolidate its power around its professional knowledge, buffering itself
from demands by its clients and top management [27,28,72]. In some organi
zations top management reCentralized computing to gain or regain control of
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the increasingly important and complicated data processing function. In
other cases, control over computing tended to devolve to the decentralized
facilities as part of a larger decentralization of organizational activity.
Hiere were also problems with centralized installations located in the
finance/accounting unit. Centralization helped top management to contain
costs and retain control over the growth and use of the technology. But it
also resulted in serious disagreements between the finance/accounting unit
and new users that wished to use computing. New users found themselves
increasingly dependent on an important resource that was controlled by a
department that had little understanding of their needs, and little inclin
ation to take their problems seriously. The finance/accounting unit was
busy trying to get its own needs satisfied. The new users felt shut out
of responsive service, and found it difficult to have their special needs
met. They also began to discover (as did the finance/accounting users) that
they were becoming increasingly dependent on the technical data processing
specialists who worked for the finance/accounting unit.
These pressures often resulted in the creation of independent data
processing departments, usually under direct control of top management. This
reform was designed to preserve the benefits of centralization while reducing
the inter-departmental disagreements about access to services. It also
moved computing closer to top management, elevating the status of the data
processing professionals. These professionals would run the computing service
like a "business," providing high-quality services to all users whfle care
fully managing the computing operation to achieve maximum efficiencies and
effectiveness. To overcome problems of disagreements among user departments
about priorities and quality of service, and to improve accountability of
the service to top management, these independent data processing units often
established managerial mechanisms to improve their performance as professional
service providers. They developed detailed and structured needs assessment
procedures, complete with cost-benefit analyses, to assess user requests for
new systems or rewrites of old systems. They established "chargeout" poli
cies to impose pseudo-market constraints on use of computing services. They
trained managers and users in use of computing. They created user policy
boards and steering committees to help determine organizational needs for
computing and the means to meet them. In short, they made concerted efforts
to find facts and establish consensus on goals, in keeping with the rational
ist view of the world.
In spite of these reforms, the countervailing pressures remained and in
some cases intensified. The movement of data processing upward in the organi
zational hierarchy removed it even further from the operating needs of user
departments. User departments lost even more autonomy in dealing with their
data processing needs because the new data processing unit was directly under
the control of top management. The establishment of an independent data
processing unit made it difficult to negotiate favorable terms for service,
since the independent unit was there to serve "all" users. In fact, the
user departments that traditionally had made the heaviest demands on computing
services, such as finance/accounting, became the most important "customers"
of the new independent data processing departments. They were usually taken
more seriously than smaller users, since they provided the bulk of the data
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processing department's business. But even the major users faced loss of
autonomy in their operations, new inflexibility in exploiting the productiv
ity-improving potential of the technology, and the denial of the opportunity
to exploit the entertainment value of computing. The rise of the DP special
ists to a position just below top management meant that even the major users
had to acccept the standards of the data processing department. The indepen
dent data processing department succeeded in accommodating several of the
major considerations in the centralization/decentralization debate, but it
did not meet them all.
The era of dominance of the centralized, independent DP shop lasted
from the early-1960s to the mid-1970s. During this time the tradition
al advantages of centralization prevailed, while the advent of timesharing
and remote terminals and job entry/output sites provided users with more
direct access to the computing resource. The dominance of this arranagement
began to subside in the mid-1970s due to the introduction of new technology,
especially the mini-computer, which provided somewhat less computing power
than the large computer mainframe but at much lower price. This lowered the
entry cost of computing. Minicomputers could do many of the smaller jobs
then being done one the large mainframes. Their low price made them attractive
to user departments that traditionally depended for service on the centralized
computing installation. They could be bought in small pieces, which disaggre
gated the purchase of a computer. A number of small, incremental purchase
decisions enabled the assembly of a computer system by obtaining individual
purchase approvals at much lower levels in the organization hierarchy than
those required for purchase of large and expensive mainframes. As long as
these purchases were not questioned, the establishment of minicomputer opera
tions in user departments could proceed.
In the late 1970's the commercial appearance of the microprocessor,
brought about by use of integrated circuits, again cut the cost of basic
computer equipment. By 1980 a computer system with an 8 bit processor, 48K
main memory, a 5 megabyte hard disk drive, an operating system, a terminal,
and a hard-copy printer could be purchased for less than $6,000. Expenditures
this low are almost insignificant in the budgets of major departments in
large organizations, making them easy to get approval for.
4.1.4 The current situation. These small and inexpensive computers have
radically changed the centralization/decentralization debate. User depart
ments can now obtain their own computing capability, in some cases without
even the knowledge of top management or the central data processing depart
ment. When a department's desire to purchase its own small computer or
computers becomes known, the department can argue that the cost is so small
that no economic arguments in favor of centralization are meaningful. These
new computers are "affordable." Citing numbers 1, 3, 7, 8, and 9 of the needs
noted above as a guide, widespread use of small computers can provide highly
individualistic service to all the departments needing computing, allow
users to establish and maintain autonomy in their operations using their own
equipment, and provide users with hands-on opportunity to enjoy computing use
while improving departmental productivity. Concern for costs (need number 2)
seems unwarranted because these small machines are so inexpensive and off-the-
shelf software for mini and micro computers makes it possible to keep opera
tions costs down.
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Assuming for the moment these arguments are correct, there remain several
problems. As the review of the evolution of data processing in organizations
shows, the characteristics surrounding the considerations in the centrali
zation/decentralization debate might change, but the considerations them
selves do not-. The deployment of many small computers throughout the organi
zation raises concerns for three of these considerations. First, the use of
computer systems by users not familiar with the broader requirements of
system management might compromise the quality of computing activity in the
organization (need 6). Many practices the centralized DP shops have learned
over the years, often at considerable cost, will not be known to the new
users of small systems. These include methods for forecasting system require
ments and costs, development of backup and fail-safe procedures, adoption
and enforcement of documentation and maintenance standards, and effective
ways of dealing with vendors and suppliers. The small scale of individual
installations might reduce the impact of problems in these areas, but the
aggregate of such problems throughout the organization could be serious.
Second, allowing user departments carte blanche to establish their own
small computing operations increases the likelihood of disintegration in
inter-departmental operations (need 4). This is especially true if incom
patible systems are adopted through which interdepartmental information must
flow, but it applies even to situations where small systems are compatible
with one another at the hardware and software levels. Computing entails
more than hardware and software; it includes the whole package of procedures
and protocols required for smooth use of the technology [28,59,66]. Unless
these too are standardized throughout the organization, there arises the op
portunity for serious mismatches from one department to another. The dilemma
of deciding between organizational standardization and departmental autonomy
persists.
Third, the devolvement of data processing activities to the departmental
level can increase the difficulty of obtaining data for top management use
(need 5). For years a major goal of the DP profession has been to enhance
the provision of information to top-level decisionmakers. But this is diffi
cult even with centralized operations. The problems are not so much in the
technology, but in determining what information to provide and how to provide
it. The adoption of differing departmental standards and protocols makes
uniform collection of data for upward-reporting more difficult, while the
imposition of organization-wide standards diminishes departmental autonomy.
There is no easy answer to the centralization/decentralization debate.
The fundamental considerations in the debate continue to assert themselves
regardless of the technology, simply because they contain internal contra
dictions. The issue is not so much where the computer processors are located,
or how decisions are made to acquire them. Rather, the fundamental issue
is control over computing: who does it, what they do with it, and how they
do it. Control must reside someplace. It cannot be shared equally among
different groups of different opinions. The basic question has never been
as simple as "which way is best?" Usually the question is "who's way is it
going to be?" The advent of small computers with low purchase prices does
not change this. It merely rearranges the bases on which the various sides
take their positions and construct their arguments.
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The issues involved in centralization/decentralization decisions are
deeply tied to organizational behavior, and the consequences of centraliza
tion/decentralization politics become increasingly important as organizational
investments in and dependency on computers increase. It is likely, therefore,
that the debate will either be flaring or smoldering beneath the surface
waiting to flare again.
4.2 The Economic Dynamics of Deployment Decisions
The economics of different deployment arrangements is critical in the
debate because economic opportunities or constraints are often the most
extensively discussed criteria in the political process of deciding whether
to centralize or decentralize. Changing economic conditions keep centrali
zation/decentralization questions alive by altering the economic rationales
behind either course of action. The declining cost of computers, for example,
has altered the economic justifications that traditionally pointed to central
ization as the prudent arrangement. As long as the economies inherent in
different deployment strategies are undergoing change, there can be no perman
ent resolution to the centralization vs. decentralization question on economic
grounds.
A detailed discussion of these factors sets the stage for coping with
the centralization/decentralization debate in the era of changing computing
technology and applications. As technology and applications change, the op
portunities for exploitation of the potentials of computing change as well.
To understand the economic dynamics of computing as they relate to
centralization/decentralization decisions, the issue can be structured in the
terms of the costs and benefits of computing and how they interact.
4.2.1. Computing costs. The cost dynamics of computing have changed
substantially over the past two decades. Nowhere has this change been more
dramatic than in the relative costs of hardware and software in computing
systems. Boehm [9,10] claims that in 1955 computer hardware costs dominated
software costs 7:1, but by 1985 software costs are expected to dominate hard
ware costs 9:1. This is a dramatic reversal, with equally dramatic effects
on perceptions about the costs of computing generally. The acquisition of
computer hardware usually preceeds acquisition of software, so this shift
has had the effect of reducing the entry costs of computing. Starting into
computing activity by procuring computers has become comparatively less
costly than successfully implementing computing systems that actually meet
organizational needs. The important point in this change is the altered
view of the costs of computing it has produced. Computing now appears to
many decisionmakers as inexpensive, but a closer look reveals that this is
not so.
There is little comprehensive research on the costs of computing, but
what does exist suggests that computing costs are substantial and often higher
than they are estimated to be [63]li. Underestimates are common because
there are many hidden costs of computing, such as computing-related staff
costs hidden in user departments and therefore not accounted for in computing
budgets [91], staff time of users and upper management who must deal with
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less like the operations they replace. Their implementation comes to require
considerably more preparation, training, and time, all of which are very
expensive. Complex systems are more likely to malfunction than are less
complex systems, and are more difficult to fix because of their interdepen-
dency in operation [62,67,116]. Most fixes are like "patches" sewn on the
fabric of the system. Often, they do not solve the problem, but "work around"
it. In complex systems, patches frequently generate new problems as they
deal with old ones, and the new problems must be patdied as well. Extensive
patching will destroy the design integrity of the original system, and systems
often must be completely rebuilt before their expected useful life is over
[66,76,77,78].
A final factor is the growth of integrated systems that organizations
depend on. Integration means the interconnection of different systems or
subsystems to form larger systems, often accomplished by linking systems so
one provides output that serves as input to another. There have been a few
efforts to build integrated systems from the ground up, but they have not
been successful [64,71]i Most system integration comes by linking together
otherwise stand-alone applications. Integration makes systems more complica
ted, which increases system costs. It also requires successful and timely
performance of organizational units that use the systems. Both the
system and all its users must interact in a smooth coordinated manner to
take advantage of integration. Unintegrated systems and the interactions
among organizational units are usually coordinated through policies and
protocols that allow for slippage along the boundaries. Delays and problems
that arise in one system or unit can be taken care of within the system or
unit before it is necessary to interact with other systems or units. This
slippage can yield considerable efficiency because it encourages highly
localized, concentrated, and effective efforts to mitigate the problems that
inevitably arise. Integrated systems make organizational units more inter
dependent in real-time, so problems in one system or unit can literally stop
progress in others simply by disruption of the process of interaction.
Integration can increase interdependency, and if interdependency cannot be
coordinated and maintained in real time, costs from disruption will rise.
In summary, the overall cost of computing appears to be rising rapidly
as new systems are implemented, as the price of technical talent increases
due to intense demand and short supply, as maintenance costs of existing
systems mount, as the complexity of computing systems increases (thereby
driving up development, maintenance, management and replacement costs), and
as previously stand-alone automated tasks are linked together in complex,
integrated systems. The only factors that might alter these cost dynamics
are a dramatic increase in the productivity of technical specialists who build
and maintain such systems (brought about through implementation of new methods
and/or technologies), or a curtailment in the growth of computing application
causing the demand for such resources to fall back in line with supply.
4.2.2. The question of benefits. Computing is used because it has demon
strable benefits. These benefits do not accrue across the board in computing
applications, however. They are primarily concentrated in those applications
of the technology that assist in conducting routine, well understood tasks
[62,70,73]. Benefits predicted as the most significant economically--cost
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reductions and staff reduct1ons--have not appeared as expected, and are now
seldom promised in systems proposals [36], Computing's primary benefits
have been three: improved speed and accuracy for some tasks, creating an
opportunity to avoid hiring new staff; qualitative improvements in operations
(e.g., reduced error rates, more flexibility in reporting and data manipula
tion, a greater range of analyses available); and increased capabilities for
performing structured but complex tasks (e.g., airline reservation systems).
Benefits from computing application to more complex and uncertain tasks
such as management decision-making are more difficult to ascertain. Most
claims that applications such as decision support systems "save money" weaken
considerably on close examination because extensive development costs are
usually excluded from the equation. Sof^isticated systems for solving
complex problems take a great deal more effort to develop than do simpler
systems, and usually a lot longer time. This leaves more opportunity to omit
significant costs from the "cost" side of the cost-benefit equation [63].
There is a propensity for measurable costs to outdistance measurable benefits,
which is why "runaway costs" and "cost overruns" are familiar terms, while
"runaway benefits" and "benefit overruns" are not. The learning costs that
go into building successful systems are accrued by way of the cost overruns
incurred in development of unsuccessful or marginally successful systems.
Despite structured design and other techniques for "deliberately" producing
successful systems, most development is a trial and error process. The
failure rate in systems development is high, just as it was 15 years ago
[19].
Economic benefits claimed for most systems are not based on the amount
of money saved, but on the differences in the character of the tasks per
formed with computing that seem beneficial to the using organization.l^
Often, these benefits are intangible, particularly those dealing with "im
proved information." This problem is illustrated by experience with another
information technology, the office photocopier. This technology has in
creased both the volume and velocity of paper flow. Presumably, this increase
in paper flow is beneficial because of the information written on the paper.
But what is the "benefit" of having copies of memos go personally to five
people instead posting a copy in a central location where all can see it?
Improvements in organizational information flow and communication are extreme
ly hard to measure. Often, no one knows what the information flow or the
quality of the communication was in the first place, and it is difficult to
put a value on the change even if it can be firmly measured.
The economic benefits of computing systems tend to be demonstrated by
the argument that computing must produce benefits because so many organiza
tions use it.This argument makes two critical assumptions: that the
true costs, short-run and long, are known to the organization when it makes
its decisions; and that estimates of the benefits it will receive are reason
able and not exaggerated. If these two assumptions are in error, outcomes
can be drastically different from expectations. The adoption of computing
systems does suggest that the adopters find benefits from computing, but
not what kinds of benefits. Some adoption decisions are made on strict
economic grounds, but most are influenced to some degree by other organiza
tional and political factors (e.g., a department manager's strategy to become
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a computer user to build his budgetary claims, or simply the desire to have
his own computer).
A final problem in assessing the benefits of computing across organiza
tions rests in the choice of the applications evaluated. Successful systems
demonstrate what is possible, but not what is likely to happen in most in
stances. Predicting industry-wide potential of computers based on experiences
of a small number of highly talented organizations is unwise. One must look
at what actually occurs in most organizations. Sophisticated applications
and innovations in computing can be found in many organizations, but they
appear thinly and sparsely across the population of organizations [59,70].
A given organization might have one or two significant and successful innova
tions, but the rest are either rather routine applications, or are "failed"
examples of more ambitious efforts. The benefits of such innovations are
often discussed in terms of their demonstrated potential in a few special
cases, and not on their probable performance in wide deployment.
A summary of vAiat is known about the benefits of computing in organiza
tions yields seven findings: (1) Benefits seem to be difficult to pinpoint
in strict, economic terms, although the fact that computing has been and
continues to be heavily adopted and used suggests that organizations believe
the benefits are there. (2) Most direct economic benefits, such as staff
reductions and cost savings, do not seem to have materialized in most appli
cations of computing to administrative data processing. (3) Indirect economic
benefits, such as improved capabilities and cost avoidances or displacement,
do seem to have accrued as a result of computerization of administrative
data processing. (4) Most of the measurable economic benefits from comput
ing appear to come from fairly routine applications (e.g., accounting, record
keeping). (5) Economic benefits from advanced applications such as decision
support systems and planning systems are more difficult to identify, especi
ally in relation to their costs, although recent research suggests that they
do accrue in some circumstances [36]. (6) Claims of economic benefit
are usually made to justify proposed computing developments, but other organ
izational and political factors figure prominently in motivations to engage
in computing. (7) Regardless of the potentials for computing benefits
demonstrated by advanced user organizations, most organizations will take
longer to realize such benefits if they in fact do so at all.
These findings do not suggest that computing is unbeneficial in economic
terms. Rather, they imply that there are other kinds of benefits that play
a role in organizational decisions about computing (benefits of political
and personal nature for those involved), and that the hoped-for economic
benefits of computing often systems do not accrue according to plan.
4.2.3. Costs, benefits, and the centralization question. This review
of the costs and benefits of computing provides a base from which to analyze
the likely effects of centralization/decentralization decisions on the econo
mic dynamics of computing. The technological changes in computing hardware
in recent years has spurred a movement toward decentralization, or at least
toward greater proliferation of computing to outlying departments in organi
zations. It is useful now to ask what the effects of such decentralization
might be in economic terms.
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4.2.3.1 The dynamics of costs in computing. The experience of data
processing in 1arge organizations over the past two decades suggests that
decentralization of computing entails organizational changes that are likely
to prove costly for two primary reasons.
The first factor in increased computing costs from decentralization is
the expansion of computing activity as users gain control of computing re-
sources. If computing activities were only undertaken to improve efficiency
and effectiveness, and only after it had been shown that such activities
would in fact do so, this would not be a problem. But computing lures users
for other reasons, not the least being its attractiveness as an exciting and
potentially useful technology. Faith and delight in computing is a strong
motivator for adoption, and often overcomes the need for "demonstrated bene
fits" in the decision to adopt [28,69,70,129]. This phenomenon is not
new. It is evident from experience with other technologies that were initially
relatively simple and practical solutions to problems, but that over time
became important to their users in their own right. Technological advances
in such fields as automobiles, photographic equipment, home entertainment
equipment, household appliances, and medical technology have not only resulted
in improved performance for cost. They have led to major increases in consumer
expenditure in the application areas to which they are applied. As new
capabilities emerge, so too the perceived "needs" of users increase.
This phenomenon seems likely to happen in the case of new, small computer
systems. When a user department acquires a small system to take care of
small departmental needs, the needs often begin to grow. As new and more
enticing equipment becomes available, investments in the system begin to
grow. Before long, the overall investment in computing has grown far beyond
expectations. A case recently observed by the author illustrates this. A
university's financial administrators were dissatisfied with the service
they received from the campus computer center, and bought a fairly powerful
minicomputer to do their own computing jobs. They hired a staff of ten to
staff the enterprise. Within three years they had grown to two minicomputers,
were buying a third, and had a computing staff of 40. The computer center
they left had also grown bigger. These users had the best of intentions
when they got their own computing system, but they did not know what the
computer staff had learned over the years: that computing is a very expensive
business, regardless of how inexpensive it looks at the front end. To actual
ly accomplish what they wanted to do they had to continually increase
their investment. And their investment was the University's investment. In
very few cases does a computing installation, be it centralized or decentral
ized, get smaller and cheaper over time.
When control over computing procurement and systems development deci
sions devolves to users, individual departments might begin to build comput
ing systems that do not necessarily meet the same investment criteria that
purchases by the central data processing department must meet. Unwise invest
ments can be made, sometimes without the knowledge of top executives. This
came to light recently in a computer printer manufacturing company that was
deliberating over v^ether to make a $300,000 investment in new equipment
for the data processing center.17 Someone suggested that the money might
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be better spent for microprocessors for users. A study revealed that user
departments had already spent over $1 million on microcomputer and minicompu
ter equipment in the previous twelve months, without the knowledge of the
data processing department. Had the organization instituted and maintained
a strict centralization of acquisition control, it could have reviewed and
guided these procurement decisions. But that would have entailed greater
management costs for control.
The second major factor suggesting that decentralization of computing
will increase computing costs arises from changes and disruptions in organi-
zational operations that often accompany decentralization. Decentralization
requires change, and change can be planned for. But unless the move to decen
tralize is made coherently throughout the organization there cannot be a
comprehensive plan. In many organizations decentralization is happening by
default as beleaguered data processing departments simply give users permis
sion to get their own systems. In other cases users are getting their systems
without asking whether anyone else thinks they should or not. In such cases
there are no comprehensive plans. Implementation of completely new systems
in these decentralized operations will expand the number of applications the
organization must support, while displacement of services provided by central
data processing can duplicate systems already provided by the organization.
In either case, costs rise.
Perhaps most importantly, without a coherent plan for conversion to
decentralized operations it is likely that decentralized users will develop
systems that clash with their current tasks and their interactions with
other departments. As they begin to learn the deeper secrets of successful
computing, especially the immutable importance of attention to precision
and detail computing requires, they will find they must constantly adjust
their systems and their operations to bring everything into harmony. If
left alone long enough, things might "sort themselves out" through natural
processes. But this can take a long time and exact a considerable toll in
frustration and resources.
It is possible to make a coherent plan for decentralization, but this
too will be expensive because the technical details and the interests of
the different parties involved make the task complicated, and there are
considerable costs for implementing even well developed plans. The dilemma
in the case of organizational control and planning for decentralization is
that there are high costs from either no control or careful control. Careful
control requires a commitment to explore the options, work out the compromises,
and make the considerable up-front investment in planning necessary to execute
a coherent change. There must be some incentive for top managers, data pro
cessing professionals and users to seek the creation of a plan. Often the
incentives are not present, or at least not present in equal measure for all,
and gradual evolution toward decentralization might be the easier course.
Unfortunately, this approach is often more costly in the end, as changes
must be made to "reintegrate" computing operations with top management desires
and to restore coherence in computing uses and activities.
Decentralization of computing is likely to increase the costs of comput
ing for most organizations as new users of computing expand their uses of
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technology (possibly without careful thought about net benefits to the organi
zation), and as the process of decentralization demands management attention
and/or causes disruptions in normal affairs. The former problem arises
from some behavioral factors that influence how and why people acquire new
technologies.- The latter is a consequence of any major organizational change.
Whether the investment that decentralization of computing requires of the
organization is warranted depends on the benefits to be derived from the
move to decentralize.
4.2.3.2 Decentralization benefits: possibility and reality. There are
several commonly hoped-for benefits from "stand-alone" decentralization (i.e.,
the establishment of small, independent computer activities in user depart
ments). It usually provides users with easier access to the technology,
which can result in greater use. It can increase user involvement in system
design and modification, resulting in systems of greater utility to the users.
It can increase user sophistication in the use of the technology, thereby
enabling users to make more efficient and effective use of the technology.
Finally, it allows users the opportunity to decide for themselves how comput
ing best can be of service to them.
These benefits of decentralization can accrue to users, and thereby
to the organization overall, provided that the other factors that enable
such benefits are present. Easier access and increased use will only be
beneficial as long as the uses themselves are beneficial. Users must know
how to distinguish wasteful from productive uses. User involvement in
design will produce systems of greater utility only if users are sufficiently
knowledgeable about computing to design-in the most productive features while
leaving out fancy but costly "wish list" features. Users almost certainly
will learn more about computing, but this knowledge must be comprehensive
enough to engender a sophisticated understanding of computing and its role
in the organization. Where users will acquire these knowledge skills is
unclear. There already exists a shortage of high quality data processing
personnel, so hiring complete staffs of specialists for user departments will
be prohibitively expensive. Vendor-provided training might be technically
valuable, but is unlikely to teach the more subtle skills of evaluating and
judging the worth of systems needed to make users discriminating in their
assessments. Users must become sufficiently savvy in their understanding of
computing to exploit the benefits of improved access to and involvement with
computing that decentralization affords, WiiTe making the correct decisions
about how to use their control wisely in the organization's interests.
These concerns apply to stand-alone decentralization, but there are
additional concerns that arise with "networked" decentralization. There are
a number of predicted advantages to be had by combining decentralization,
strategies with telecommunications and networking technologies. Users will
have the ability to "share" machines, thereby avoiding the loss of large
available capacity from centralized arrangements. They will be able to tap
into network-wide data bases, reducing data redundancy. They will be able
to interactively use their own and other machine or network resources and
data, and integrate their work with others in the organization. Networking
requires interdependency of equipment, reducing the tendency of decentralized
units to adopt equipment that is incompatible with other units. Finally,
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networking can improve relations among units, facilitate organization-wide
controls and computing management, and reduce problems of maintaining top
management control common to decentralized, stand-alone systems.
These benefits from networked decentralization are technically feasible,
but they are less likely to occur than are the benefits from stand-alone
decentralization noted above. They depend on technological capabilities that
are not yet proven, and on organizational behaviors that are not common.
The ability to actually share computing resources among networked machines
is limited at this time. The major experimental networks (e.g., ARPANET and
the CSNET) do not allow actual linking of machine resources, but merely
allow users to communicate with other network users or to move to the machine
of their choice to conduct their work. Computing power is not shared among
machines, but among users and host organizations, using a heavily subsi
dized recharge system that radically distorts the cost picture perceived by
both hosts and users. There are more serious limitations with the emerging
network technologies, especially local area networks designed to allow
machine-to-machine communications at high data rates. The goal of designing
such networks is to enhance communications among users, and allow users to
use different resources available through the network. Such networks could,
in theory, provide a means for having both centralized and decentralized
computing simultaneously. Shared functions (e.g., large processors, data
bases, special machines or peripherals) could be provided from one location
but available to all through the network. Local users with their own processor
and storage capabilities would also be able to use the shared resources
through the net. The technical problems with this approach might be solved
in time, but as yet networks are not available in the same sense that main
frames or terminals are [100]. There are also unresolved management concerns,
such as who will be in control of the network and who will be allowed to
connect to it. At this time networking is highly experimental, with the
attendant risks of experimentation.
The implementation of organization-wide data bases on networks also
presents problems of control over data that could be even more difficult than
in large centralized computing installations. Information provides users
with power in proportion to the desirability of that information to others,
and few organizational units are comfortable giving other units or higher
management open and easy access to their data. Centralized data processing
forces departments to relinquish and centralize data. Once users have their
own systems, there will be no centralized authority to enforce data sharing
through direct sanctions on computing use. Formal rules governing access to
data are weak mechanisms of enforcement, since there are are many ways for
users to make the actual accessing of the data costly to those trying to get
it. Users with their own computing capability can be difficult to hold in
compliance with organization-wide rules. Data sharing will not necessarily
be increased by networked decentralization.
Increased interaction among users might not be facilitiated by networked
systems. Communication does take place through experimental networks such
as ARPANET and CSNET, but it is dangerous to infer too much from these experi
ments because they involve unusually sophisticated users (technically
sophisticated academics, researchers, and professionals) with the needs and
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skills to cominunicate with others on their highly subsidized nets. For
most organizations the integration of work through networked computing will
be a long time evolving, and will entail substantial costs as users learn
what the networks facilitate and what they do not.
Compatibility of equipment will not be ensured by networking unless
highly centralized control is maintained to ensure that compatibility is an
ironclad requirement for procurements. Networked arrangements contain the
same forces that create pressure for incompatibility in other organizational
contexts. In extreme cases, decentralized organizational computing centers
have been known to adopt the strategy of "maximum feasible incompatibility"
in computing equipment and operating systems procurement to prevent other
centers from absorbing them. The organizational decision to decentralize
computing might be reversed, so it is sometimes in the interest of decentral
ized user departments to make such a reversal difficult and costly for or
ganizational management to implement.
Networking decentralized computing establishments will not necessarily
facilitate managerial control because possession of computing capability is
nine-tenths of the law in control of the technology. Decentralized units
that are permitted to acquire their own capability will seek to build up
their capability to meet their own needs, possibly weakening the ties to the
network and reducing managerial control options. Without serious top manage
ment restrictions on capability and activity at the unit level, and real
control reserved at some central node under direct managerial control, there
is only the budgetary process and broad-brush, top-down policy to enforce
management expectations on user behavior. Such weak enforcements often
prove to be more costly and less effective than the more direct control of
resources that a central computer center provides. Networking by itself is
not likely to strengthen management control of decentralized computing activi
ties.
4.3 The Interaction of Political and Economic Considerations
Both political and economic considerations are important in the cen
tralization vs. decentralization debate. The importance of each depends
on the situation at hand. When there is considerable organizational upheaval
underway, political considerations can overshadow economic factors entirely.
This can happen when departments are competing with one another for resources
to expand, where top management is seeking to reestablish its control author
ity, or where a new managerial strategy is being implemented (e.g., a move
from highly central corporate control to divisional control). In other
cases, the economic issues can enable undercurrents of change to come forward
as serious options, or even force changes in order to take advantage of new
opportunities. Hie high costs of computer processors required many organi
zations to move departmental data processing activities to centralized units,
and the declining costs of computer processors enables a movement of such
activities back to departments. Other economic factors, such as the rising
costs of software development and maintenance, the costs of networking, and
the problems of supply and demand in the DP labor market can have equally
important effects.
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Neither the political factors or the economic factors can be considered
universally dominant. Both influence decisions in important ways. However,
the fact that many organizations have chosen and stayed with less economical
arrangements suggests that political factors often are paramount. This
observation requires some qualification: the question of what is "economical"
might entail more than simple costs and benefits, and include other considera
tions, such as a desire to pursue a particular organizational strategy even
though it is expensive because it is thought to yield long-run benefits.
Nevertheless, the politics of organization and resources should be considered
a fundamentally important factor in the centralization vs. decentralization
debate. Economic issues, while important, are frequently merely weapons in
debates about centralization/decentralization policy that are in fact based
on political factors. This does not mean that the economic issues are
unimportant. Rather, it means that the larger set of factors behind the call
for either course of action must be considered. The following section
addresses the basic management options for centralization/decentralization
policy with these factors in mind.
5. MANAGEMENT OPTIONS IN CENTRALIZATION vs. DECENTRALIZATION
At base, the issue of whether to centralize or decentralize computing
revolves around balancing needs and desires of those at the center against
those in outlying units. The debate usually turns on questions of costs and
benefits, but what is a cost and what is a benefit often depends on where
one sits in the organization and v^at one's goals are. Many different or
ganizational interests are at stake. The fundamental question, iMien one
looks carefully at the issue, is who will have control over computing pro
curement, use, and management?
If the issue were solely economic there might not be the fervor one
often finds. The traditional literature suggests that centralization gen
erally is less costly to the organization than decentralization. As the
assessment of economic dynamics above implies, this is likely to remain the
case despite falling entry costs for computing. But other factors beyond
simple economy are involved, and the economics involved are often complicat
ed." The challenge facing managers is to find an arrangement for computing
that provides users with the means to meet their computing needs, as well as
experiment with and learn about the technology, without writing a blank check
for computing or creating problems for management control and organizational
operations. This section will summarize the major management options for
dealing with this challenge, and suggest a strategy for finding the appro
priate option given organizational conditions.
5.1 A No-Option Option
Before reviewing the major options, it is critical to point out that
managers do not have the option of letting the issue resolve itself in a
convenient and appropriate manner. There are two reasons why this option is
foreclosed. One is the continuing presence of organizational factors that
keep, the debate alive, regardless of the strategy followed. The question is
not whether the issue must be addressed, but when and how often. The other
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is the disappearance of automatic managerial control over computing growth
resulting from the declining significance of computer procurement decisions.
When mainframe costs were high the scale of computing purchases forced computer
procurement decisions to higher management, and issues regarding how the
technology would be used and controlled could be addressed. As computer
prices have dropped, so too have the procurement thresholds to be crossed in
acquiring a computer. Unless managers want to issue categorical directives
governing procurement and use of computers, which in itself raises difficul
ties (e.g., is a sophisticated programmable calculator a computer?), users
that want small computers will probably find ways to acquire them. And even
categorical directives about procurement of computer systems can be disobeyed,
subverted, or simply ignored.18 fhe new realities of the centralization/
decentralization debate require managers to face and deal with a much more
complex set of decisions than in the past.
5.2 The Centralization Continuum
Figure 1 presents the major options managers have in arranging for the
three major aspects of centralization/decentralization: control, location,
and function. Each is presented in terms of a continuum between extreme
central ization and decentralization strategies. The category in between,
intermediate arrangements, does not capture all possible points between the
extremes, but does illustrate how one might arrange a compromise. Generally,
extreme centralization strategies consolidate control in one place in the
organization, usually toward the top. They centralize facilities into a
single site that provides all basic computing service and resources, though
possibly providing remote user access through on-line services. They consoli
date functions under the central control agency and within the central facil
ity. Extreme decentralization strategies, conversely, devolve control over
computing to user departments, permit user departments to establish their own
facilities, and allow user departments to carry out the functions of
computing activity according to their own arrangements. Note that even ex
treme decentralization does not preclude some organization-wide controls,
facilties or functions. There still might be a need for such centralized
arrangements to take care of organization-wide tasks such as personnel man
agement. The key factor in extreme decentralization is that user departments
are free to acquire their own computing capabilities and build their own
computing operations.
The intermediate arrangements illustrated in Figure 1 have certain as
pects of control, location and function reserved to the center, while other
aspects of these dimensions are devolved to user departments. In the examples
shown, the primary discriminator between centralized vs. decentralized ar
rangements is corporate needs vs. user department needs. For example, control
over how much and what kinds of equipment users purchase is reserved to the
center, but given central approval, users can procure their own systems.
Major computing resources might be consolidated for efficiency, but smaller-
scale computing installations can be established in user departments. Special
functional resources such as systems programming or network management could
be preserved corporate control, while applications programming and local
data management could be the province of the department. A central control
agency would exercise oversight and review to ensure that departmental deci
sions conformed to organizational objectives.
FIGURE 1. MAJOR MANAGEMENT OPTIONS IN CENTRALIZED VS. DECENTRALIZED COMPUTING
Extensive
Centrali
zation
Intermedi
ate
Arrange
ments
Extensive
Decentra
lization
CONTROL
Consolidation in one place all decisions regarding
cniiputing procurcaient, systea dcvelopaent and
naintcnance. priority setting fur systems work and
resource usage, accounting for resource use, and
responsibility (or evaluation of computing's con-
trihiitinn In the organiiation and quality of ser
vice.
Users make inputs to these decisions through ad
visory awciiaiiisnis, such as an advisory hoard, or
hy direct contacts helHeen the central control
unit and departmental manaqement and users.
Uetentinn of central management control, eitlier
through an appointed executive or a coanlttee
(which might include user representatives), over,
all major coufiuting procurements (e.g., choice of
vendors, large purchases, compatibility standards,
and networking characteristics), all organliation-
wide systems deceisions, setting of organiiation-
wide computing priorities, accounting for systems
investments and use, and monitoring of system
quality.
Allow users to make department-level decisions for
departmental computing equipment procurement, de
partmental systems planning, quality control, and
systems management, but under strict guidelines
provided hy the central control group. The central
control group would either directly enforce* organ-
liationai guidelines, or would suggest to higher
manageotent when aixi what enforcement actions are
necessary.
Devolution to user departments most or all deci
sion making authority over procurements, system de
velopment and maintenance, priority setting, system
use accounting, and quality control. Enforcement
of organizational expectations about productivity
resuliing from user-based computing activities
would he through normal merit review and monitor
ing of departmental computing activities.
LOCATION
Estahlishwent of one (or very feu) consolidated
facilities for provision of cuui|iuting resources
and services, including processing, storage, major
peripherals, and physical environments (e.g., ter
minal rooms, tape storage).
Allow users access to these resources ami ser
vices through remote terminals and KJC equipment.
Installed ami maintained by the central facility,
and maintain contacts with users for service re
quests hy establishing appropriate mechanisms
(e.g., assigning 'account managers* to different
user groups to deal with user needs and prohlimis.
Consolidatinn of major computing resources (e.g.,
large and expensive equl|ixent, data bases, network
facilities) into one or very few centers, and make
these available to users through rexnte access
equipment.
Allow users to create their own faciities for
smaller-scale, dcpartiaent-related coaputing acti
vity. Haintaiii oversight of the scale of user op
erations to ensure against extensive duplication
and waste. Establish, where appropriate, network
ing among central and user facilities to allow
transfer of data and files, and sharing nf re
sources.
Devolving to users the right to establish their own
computing facilities where they cluMse to do so.
Require users to utiliie centralized facilities
only when necessary to meet organization-wide needs
wiien these needs cannot be net tlirough use of not-
working.
FUNCTION
Consolidation of all major coatputlng functions
(e.g., hardware operations, systems and applica
tions prograaning, telecommunicatins, quality con
trol, documentation, maintenance, and systems man
agement) Into one or very few centers, co-located
with tile centrallied facility. Require depart
ments to conform to central protocnis for use of
these functional resources. Training of users done
by the centrallied resource.
Allow users to manage only those computer-related
functions directly related to their departmental
activities (e.g.. data entry). Allow user parti
cipation in system design. Have users evaluate
the service provided hy the centrallied functions.
Consolidation of major functions (I.e.. highly spe
cial lied or expensive functions) such as sytcms
prograniing, telecomuinications management, data
base management, network management, or quality
control. These might he consolidated In a 'pool*
arrangement provided by a major facility, or as a
staff function of upper management.
Allow users to acquire their own functional capa
bilities, for department-related needs such as ap
plications prograxNing and,local data base manage
ment. Users manage and maintain their local faci
lities.
Devolution to users the authority to establish
their own functional resource centers, and permit
total user control over fitting the activities of
those resource-providers into departmental opera
tions. Users provide for their own facility xun-
agemcnt, quality control, and training, though
perhaps through contractual deals with other lic-
partmeots.
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Each alternative has advantages and drawbacks. Extreme centralization
keeps computing activity and growth under control of the center. It can
allow efficiencies from economies of scale, and provide substantial over
head justification for procurement of expensive but specialized capabilities
(e.g., powerful equipment or personnel with exotic skills). It enables
direct and generally effective control over adherence to organizational
standards in system design and quality, and makes computing activity easy
to keep track of by top management. On the other hand, extreme centrali
zation can result in the creation of an insensitive bureaucracy that fails
to provide users with what they need and want, and that is difficult for
users to interact with. In some cases, centralized operations grow lazy and
fail to encourage the exploitation of new opportunities computing might offer.
Moreover, centralized service providers must account for their expenses,
which tend to be significant and organizationally obvious. If computing is
provided as an overhead item, top management often will wonder whether good
use is being made of this expensive function. If computing services are
charged back by billing users for service, users often feel they pay too
much for the services they receive. This is exacerbated if there are
frictions between the central computing service and user departments. When
backlogs for development of new systems grow long, which they do when
maintenance demands of existing systems grow large, users begin to wonder
whether their best interests are served by the centralized facilities.
The lure of low entry costs for getting their own computing capability provides
a strong incentive for departments to lobby for decentralization, backed up
by the "evidence" of poor service and high costs from the centralized facility.
Extreme decentralization provides much greater flexibility for users
in exploiting computing technology and adapting it to user needs. It gives
users the opportunity to learn about computing in much greater detail, which
can eventually make them more effective consumers of this technology. Pro
perly handled, it can build up the computing talent of the overall organiza
tion by creating a "grass roots" computing culture throughout the organiza
tion. It can enhance the willingness of departments to accept changes that
might be beneficial to the organization. Most importantly, it can result in
productivity improvements when sensible applications of the technology take
place at the departmental level that could not or would not be provided by
centralized service. The drawbacks of extreme decentralization are that
overall organizational costs of computing are likely to rise. This is accept
able if productivity improvements rise commensurately, but this will not
happen unless the departmental uses of computing are well planned, well
executed and well maintained. New users have yet to learn the lessons their
more experienced counterparts have learned, and the price for this learning
can be dear. The investment the organization makes in bringing new users
up to competence (which is often buried in other costs) can easily offset
the productivity gains from decentralized computing. Departmental personnel
who become competent in computing soon discover the marketability of their
new talents, and either demand wage increases or leave for better opportuni
ties. If they stay, they can begin to see themselves as more appropriately
aligned with the career of computing than with their functional responsibili
ties, causing personnel problems. Perhaps most important for top management,
extreme decentralization can make it very difficult to keep computing activi
ties in conformance with organizational goals. If control over computing
truly devolves to users, users can easily make organizationally suboptimal
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decisions. Once their facilities and computing operations are in place,
the costs of change to conform to new organizational guidelines can be
prohibitive. Giving away control is often easier than getting it back.
Intermediate arrangements aopear to be promising as compromise solutions,
and they can fulfill this role.^' It can be very effective to retain central
ized control, facilities, and functions in cases where this is necessary or
desirable, while allowing limited decentralization where the payoffs are
likely to be high. Thus top management might reserve to the center those
activities and functions upon which the organization as a whole directly
depends, while allowing users to take advantage of the technology within
guidelines ranging from strict to relaxed, depending on circumstances. This
strategy will probably characterize most computer-using organizations in the
future, since circumstances in most organizations make it sensible to compro
mise. But intermediate arrangements have important drawbacks. The question
of which compromise arrangement to pursue is difficult to answer, and in its
own way embodies the problems of the overall centralization/decentralization
debate. It is sometimes impossible to differentiate between computing acti
vities that are organization-wide and those that are department-specific,
because some serve both purposes. Yet the question remains: should control
be left to the center or to the outlying units?
Intermediate strategies also require extensive attention from both top
management and departmental management. Planning and executing an intermedi
ate arrangement requires creation of protocols to govern who is responsible
for vhat and in which cases. Since intermediate arrangements do require
some control to be devolved to user departments, central management must
find a way of letting that control go while encouraging departmental manage
ment to conform to the goals of the overall organization. Once arrangements
are in place, they must be maintained and enforced. The creation of a
compromise does not eradicate the root causes of centralization/decentrali-
zation disputes. It merely finds a way of acknowledging the different
interests in the debate and providing them with at least some of what they
want so they can get on with the organization's business. The same changes
that affect the traditional centralization/decentralization debate will af
fect any compromise.20
5.3 Mixed Strategies
The discussion thus far has focused on the advantages and disadvantages
of three points along the centralization/decentralization continum. It is
not necessary, however, to maintain the same level of centralization across
all three dimensions of control, location, and function. For example, some
organizations have long maintained centralized control and facilities, while
decentralizing to users the opportunity to acquire their own applications
programmers or other functional capabilities. These mixed strategies (as
opposed to intermediate arrangements) can work well. But a very important
observation must be made about them. Theoretically, one could choose any
In practice, the choices are more limited. The most effective way to explain
the realistic options is to note that mixes can only be made by choosing
cells across and down to the right of Figure 1. Thus it would be possible
to have highly centralized control, somewhat decentralized facilities, and
cell from each column in Figure 1 when determining computing arrangements.
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widely centralized functions. It is not feasible to choose mixes moving up
ward to the right. The reason for this is the critical influence of control
arrangements over all other arrangements, and the influence of location over
function. As noted earlier, control cannot be equally shared among everybody
involved in computing if organization management is to maintain the ability to
direct the uses of computing to organizational goals. The moment one faction
loses in a dispute, it is clear that the winning faction has control over
that issue. Control over computing really means somebody in control.
This does not imply that a federation of independent users cannot form a
consortium and pool their resources to establish a centralized computing
facility with centralized functions. This can and does happen. For example,
the federation of local governments in Denmark created a nation-wide service
organization called Kommunedata which provides computing service to nearly
every local government in the country [114]. But such examples do not apply
to this discussion for several reasons. In the first place, the practical
effect of the federation's action is to place somebody (i.e., the central
facility's leadership) in control. A board of directors representing the
federation might provide some policy direction and hire and fire the director
of the service, but they cannot practically control the function of the ser
vice from the top down. Second, most arrangements of this kind (including
Kommunedata's) soon begin to feel the tugs of centrifugal force as members of
the federation want to pull out and develop their own capabilities. If the
independent units do retain control, this is an option they can pursue. If
they cannot pull out, they have relinquished control.
This raises the issue of the relationship between location and control,
and the influence of location over function. As noted earlier, in the control
of computers possession is nine-tenths of the law. Those who control central
ized facilities have great power to direct the actions of users of the facil
ities through their policies and practices. Their power derives from the
simple but effective sanction of witholding or restricting service to user
departments that fail to comply with facility management. Centralized
facilities will usually be responsive to highly centralized, top management
controls, again in keeping with the rule of "across and down to the right"
in Figure 1. But they need not be responsive to a consortium of users,
especially if no one user or minority group of users can effectively split
off to establish their own facility. Of course, in the end the centralized
facility must meet the minimum demands of their clients or the complaints of
the clients"will bring top management to bear on the issue.
Location, or facilities in the case of computing, influences function
in the same way that control influences facilities. Functions that are de
pendent on computing are tied to the facilities they utilize, and must con
form to the demands of the facilities. They also share affinity with the
facilities, since they are computing-related and the facilities have the
computers. Centralized facilities with decentralization of functional re
sources such as programmers to user departments can create in these program
mers split loyalties. They serve their departments, and may even depend on
departmental evaluations for their employment and advancement, but they are
part of the culture of computing. They need access to the computing re
sources the facility has, and they share common bonds of knowledge and career
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with facility staff. Yet even with split loyalties it is possible to have
centralized facilities and decentralized functions as long as the responsi
bilities of the decentralized specialists to their operating departments are
clear. When facilities are decentralized but functional personnel are cen
tralized they find themselves facing the problem of employees in "matrix
organizations-": their administrative home is in the central department or
pool, but their actual performance takes place in the decentralized depart
ments or facilities. The people who evaluate them for advancement within
the pool do not have much contact with the work they actually do. Eventually,
there is a tendency for these functional specialists to want to move their
positions to the facilities and departments they serve. Thus, decentralized
location encourages decentralized functions.
Hie realistic options for arranging control, location, and function in
computing therefore tend to flow downward from control arrangements. Hi is
limits the options suggested by Figure 1, but is advantageous in that it
reduces the number of alternatives management must consider. As long as
control is seen as the crucial dimension of the centralization/decentrali
zation debate, and the arrangements for location and function correspond to
the behavioral realities that arise from control decisions, sensible arrange
ments are possible.
5.4 Choosing an Option
Given these options, the final question to be faced is which option is
appropriate for a given organization. There is not sufficient room here
to provide examples of all the cases in which various configurations might
be appropriate, but there are some guidelines for the process of deciding
that are useful.
First, control must be recognized as the most important issue in making
central ization/decentralization decisions. Because control issues are so
critical in all aspects of organizational life, most organizations have
developed sophisticated ways of dealing with them. The prevailing norms of
the organization can provide good guidance for dealing with control over
computing. If the organization is highly centralized in most aspects of its
operations, a highly centralized control arrangement for computing is prob
ably sensible. Similarly, if the organization follows highly decentralized
control policies, such as establishment of operating units as profit centers,
decentralization of control might be necessary and desirable. Most organiza
tions have a range of control arrangements, depending on what is being con
trolled. Decisions about control over computing should parallel those organi
zational arrangements governing activities that are similar to the activities
of computing. Thus, if most of the organization's use of computing consists
of financial control applications, and financial control activities are
centralized, centralized computing control should be appropriate. On the
other hand, if computing tends to be a general purpose resource used for
many different kinds of applications at the department level, and departmental
managers have considerable autonomy in how they run their operations, some
decentralization of control to these managers might be appropriate. The
key here is to ensure that the control arrangements for computing are not
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wildly out of keeping with other organizational practices. Computing practi-.
ces should not be thought of as tools by which the basic behaviors of organi
zations can be changed.
Second, the issue of control must ultimately be decided by managers at
the center of the organization. They retain responsibility for overall
organizational operation and performance, and cannot avoid being judged
for their decisions. Whether there is a deliberate policy regarding control
of computing or an unconscious evolution of policy, the results remain the
policy of central management. Central managers should remember that devolu
tion of control over computing toward decentralization can be profitable in
some circumstances, but it can also be a source of many problems if not done
appropriately and in a manner that ensures benefits for the organization.
Recentralization of control can be difficult or even impossible, and will
usually be expensive. Decisions about decentralization of control over
computing should be made with great care.21
Third, managers should be cognizant of the ramifications of computing
location decisions. If location decisions are being made before questions of
control have been answered, these decisions should be delayed until the issue
of control is settled. The decision to decentralize computing location often
has the practical effect of decentralizing control. Centralized control and
decentralized location is possible and perhaps desirable, but it can only
occur when the arrangements are thoughtfully worked out and implemented.
Fourth, location decisions should only be made after careful assessment
of the actual uses the organization makes of computing. If the uses made
depend on availability of computing capabilities that are only available
from large and expensive processors or other costly resources, it might be
infeasible to decentralize because important uses would suffer degradation
in performance by moving to the smaller machines that usually accompany de
centralization. Many organizations have discovered too late that the small
machines departments have purchased are incapable of handling the applica
tions. Not only must current applications be reviewed, but future growth
should be considered. Many smaller computer systems have limited expansion
potential. Failure to carefully review the present and future applica
tions of computing can result in naive expectations about vAiat computing
resources will be required. Central facilities will probably be best for
applications that require large-scale computing resources or that have
organization-wide implications. Decentralized facilities will be appropriate
only for applications that make limited demands on computing equipment and
that serve only user department needs. Certain computer-based tasks such as
word processing are so directly tied to users that equipment to do them must
be decentralized in many cases.
Fifth, centralization/decentralization of location questions should be
based on the realities of current technologies, not on expectations about
new technological possibilities. Emerging data communication technologies
expand the options for deploying computer equipment. They permit networking
that can allow users access to more than one of the organization's computers.
Users with their own smaller computers will be able to conduct local processing
and upload and down-load data and files from central computers. Departments
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will be able to conduct their own computing at the departmental level, while
handling upward reporting of data to management through the network. While
these technologies might eventually provide such capabilities, they will not
alter the constraints in location decisions for some time to come in most
organizations-. This technology is still in its infancy and it is still
experimental. Only the most technically advanced organizations are endeavor
ing to install sophisticatd network systems. If past trends in diffusion of
new computing developments hold true, the majority of organizations will not
be able to adopt this technology for at least five years. Most importantly,
networking does not alleviate the problems of control raised by decentrali
zation of location, and in some cases it can create new problems. At the
least, networking is an integrating technology, and as such brings with it
the difficulties associated with integrated systems noted in section 4.2.3.2.
New. technologies do not provide a simple fix for the problem of centralized
vs. decentralized facilities.
Sixth, current arrangements should be evaluated carefully before deciding
to change to a new set of arrangements. Often the problems with present
arrangements stimulate demands for major change, but these problems might be
attenuated by minor changes in current arrangements. For example, if
users are complaining about long system development backlogs and other
problems from centralized computing service, a careful analysis might reveal
that increasing the resources of the computing center could meet these user
needs at lower cost than establishing decentralized facilties and functions.
Conversely, if decentralized arrangements are causing trouble for integrating
applications and meeting organizational guidelines for compatibilty of equip
ment, more strict procurement protocols and centralized approval for procure
ments might bring practice in conformance without requiring recentralization
of facilities. Hie problems of the current situation are often cited in
requests for major changes in centralization/decentralization arrangements,
but improving the current situation is an option easily overlooked.
Seventh, it should be recognized that there is a drive toward decentral
ization of computing among users, and this drive is likely to grow stronger
as entry costs for computing decrease. Users prefer decentralization because
they gain control of both the resources and the capabilities of computing.
Decentralization allows users to set their own priorities for computing use
and for new systems development, and gives them new claims on organizational
resources. Also, many users want to obtain computers for their entertainment
value. Computers are interesting and enjoyable to work with, which is an
important factor in the success of computing in organizations. The develop
ment of appropriate computing arrangements requires a careful assessment of
the role that each of these factors plays in the proposal to decentralize
computing. Factors such as possible improvements in effectiveness and
better user department uses of computing are likely to be cited, while a
desire to gain new resources, increased budgetary leverage, or the entertan-
ment value of computing will probably be left out. All of these factors can
play a role in proposals to decentralize computing, and it is sometimes
difficult to determine what is really at issue.
32
6. CONCLUSION
The debate over centralized vs. decentralized computing has been around
for a long time, and will be around for a long time to come. Changes in the
technology will not resolve the debate because the most important factors
in the debate are grounded in constant reassessment of where control in
organization activities ought to reside. Changes in technology merely alter
the options available and the economies surrounding each option. Neverthe
less, the debate must be resolved at least for the short run. Computing must
be provided according to some arrangement, preferably one that services the
subunits of the organization and the organization as a whole. There is no
universal "best" solution, so each organization must find its own. The quest
for this solution is not easy, but with proper attention to the endemic or
ganizational issues surrounding the debate, the economics of various arrange
ments, and the prevailing norms and goals of the organization, it is possible
to construct an arrangement that will serve until new technological or
organizational developments force a reconsideration.
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NOTES
1. The author's address is Department of Information and Computer Science,
University of California, Irvine, CA 92717. This research was supported
in part by grants from the National Science Foundation. The author
acknowledges helpful contributions from Kenneth Kraemer, Kathleen King,
Herb Schwartz, Nicholas Vitalari, and two anonymous reviewers.
2. This article deals specifically with computer application to administra
tive data processing. It does not address the special cases of process
control applications such as computer aided design and manufacturing
that typically do not require intra-organizational data sharing. How
ever, many of the issues discussed here apply also to such applications.
3. This review is based on more comprehensive papers by the author [57,58].
It should be noted that the issue of centralization and computing can be
viewed as a policy issue (i.e. what centralization/decentralization poli
cies should be followed in computing arrangements), or as a question of
computing's impact on organizational structure (i.e. does computing use
result in greater or lesser organizational centralization). This paper
deals only with centralization as a policy issue. Centralization as an
artifact of computing use is reviewed in [58] and [112].
4. This issue was usually discussed in terms of the finance and accounting
departments of organizations, where the first computerization of adminis
trative data processing usually took place.
5. This section relies on an extensive tradition of research in organiza
tional behavior, most of which takes place outside field of computing
use in organizations. In particular, it draws on the work precipitated
by Cyert and Allison [2], Arrow [4], Burns and Stalker [18], Chadwick
[21], Child [22], Cyert and March [26], Downs [35], Lawrence and Lorsch
[75], Meyer [87], Moore [89], Niskansen [92], Perrow [102,103], Wildavsky
[137] and Yin [141]. This list is by no means exhaustive. Of particular
importance to this analysis is the observation, articulated well by
[2,26,35,92,103], that the idea of genuine "organizational goals" can
be illusory. The overall directions taken by organizations might
appear to follow coherent policies aimed at consistent goals, but in
fact they are often fabricated by internal organizational conflict, and
are undergoing frequent change. In the field of computing use this
important point is raised by Kling and his colleagues [65,67], and is
found in [27,28, 58,60,61,61,64,66,69,70,71,72,82,86,106,116].
6. The importance of entertainment value in the success of computing as a
technology has been overlooked in most of the research on computing
adoption and use. Yet, the success of computer-based entertainment
products and the use of games as major marketing tools by computer
vendors suggests that this is an important factor. The author's own
experience in consulting and research indicates that most people are
curious about computers and desire to experiment with them and use them.
Resistance to use of computing seems to persist only as long as there
is uncertainty about the impact of computer use on one's job and status
within the organization.
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7. This history is an admittedly hypothetical synthesis based on the
commentaries of many who experienced and wrote about the evolution of
computing use in organizations over the past two decades (as found in
the references). Many organizations never had the experiences reported
here. The history is for illustration of the ways in which various
factors interact in the centralization vs. decentralization debate.
8. Excellent accounts of the influence that computer-generated reports
can have are found in [28,64,79].
9. Budgetary leverage refers to the role computer use can play in justifying
increases in departmental budgets. In this respect, computing is like
many other organizational activities (particularly those with bureau
cratic characteristics) that justify and enhance the organizational
positions of the units that carry them out [27,64,72,82,137].
10. Policies of this kind are discussed in [28,62,70].
11. This account is of necessity constrained by a lack of detailed,
empirical assessment of computing's economic impact. Useful references
to this subject include [63,105,110].
12. There has been considerable discussion in the literature about allevi
ating this problem [9,25,41,76]. One of the most conmon proposals is
to develop means of improving the productivity of individuals who
develop software [9,10,25,33,50,76,78,91,105,116,143]. Whether such
methods and tools will make up the difference is unclear. If they
do not, it is likely that equilibrium will be achieved by attenuation
of the number of systems developed.
13. This estimate is derived by taking the stimate of DOD expenditures on
software of $5 billion per year [9,41], and multiplying this by the
estimates of maintenance as a percentage of overall costs for military
software, thought to be between 50-80% [9,77].
14. The fact that little rigorous research has been done does not mean that
tangible benefits do not accrue from advanced applications. Edelman [36]
presents data suggesting that direct economic benefits from cost savings
and avoidance do occur from such applications in some circumstances.
15. This assumption is based on a common assumption in theories of welfare
economics: that households are the best determiners of their own
welfare. There are obvious exceptions in which intervention is re
quired from outside agents (e.g. experts), but as a general rule this
assumption seems reasonable.
16. Systematic research on the adoption and use of computers in the home
is now being conducted by Nicholas Vitalari and Alladi Venkatesh at
U.C. Irvine.
17. The author thanks Suzi lacono for assitance in compiling this infor
mation.
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18. file author is familiar with one military organization that circumvented
federal regulations centralizing procurement of computers by buying
microprocessor-based diagnostic equipment not covered by the regula
tions, removing the microprocessors from the equipment, and throwing
the rest away. Most administrative rules have loopholes.
19. Intermediate arrangements such as those suggested here have been the
subject of many recent articles on organizing the use of computing
and information technology in organizations. See in particular
[1,14,55,81,87,113,124,139].
20. A popular approach for incorporating the ideas of outlying units into
direction provided from the center is to utilize committees. This
approach, which has been enshrined in the perspective literature on
the management of computing, is being recommended as a means of dealing
with the new era of centralization/decentralization issues [95].
Research into the effectiveness of user committees suggests that they
are not very effective at solving major political problems in the
management of computing [62,70,73]. It seems the basic problems of
control remain. The growing literature on the subject of citizen
participation provides a useful analogy to the problems faced by
incorporating users in political decision processes. For example,
Arnstein's "ladder of participation" suggests that there are eight
"rungs" representing levels of actual power conferred on participants:
citizen control; delegated power, partnership; placation; consultation;
informing; therapy; and manipulation. Only the top three confer
genuine power on committee members, and these of course require that
actual power be relinquished from the center. The middle three rungs
provide for some opportunity to assess the desires and frustrations of
committee members, but action on these remains the perogative of the
existing elite. The bottom two rungs can actually result in deteriora
tion of performance because the committee can serve as a shield behind
which inadequately performing central actors can hide while maintaining
the appearance of sensitivity to users. Perhaps the most useful role
committees can serve is to help improve the sensitivity of both DP
specialists and users to one anothers' needs and problems, and facili
tate what political scientists call "mobilization of bias" among par
ticipants around genuine problems that can be solved by collective
action.
21. It is frequently suggested in prescriptive literature on the management
of computing and data processing that top management should be actively
involved in decisionmaking about DP. Recent resarch suggests that
intensive involvement of top management in such decisions is associated
with higher levels of computing problems, although why this is the
case is not clear from the data [62,73]. More often, what DP managers
need is not the involvement of top management, but their support for
decisions the DP manager makes. A lack of top management input to
decision making still allows for appropriate decisions to be made
in many cases, but a lack of top management support for the DP
managements' decisions can easily cripple implementation of those
decisions.
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FIGURE 1. MAJOR MANAGEMENT OPTIONS IN CENTRALIZED VS. DECENTRALIZED COMPUTING
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CONTROL
Consolidation In one place all decisions regarding
conqiutlng procurement, system development and
maintenance, priority setting for systems work and
resource usage, accounting tor resource use, and
responsibility for evaluation of cnmpiiting's con-
trlhiitlnn tn the organliatlnn and quality of ser
vice.
Users make Inputs to these decisions through ad
visory mechanisms, such at an advisory board, or
by direct contacts between the central control
unit and departmental management and users.
Retention of central management control, either
through an appointed executive or a coamlttee
(which might Include user representatives), over,
all major coegiutlng procurements (e.g., choice of
vendors, large purchases, compatibility standards,
and networking characteristics), all organlzatlon-
wlde systems decelslons, setting of organlzatlon-
wlde computing priorities, accounting for systems
Investments and use, and monitoring of system
quality.
Allow users to make department-level decisions for
departmental computing equipment procurement, de-
partamntal systems planning, quality control, and
systems management, but under strict guidelines
provided by the central control group. The central
control group would either directly enforce- orqan-
liationai guidelines, or would suggest to higher
management wlien and what enforcement actions are
necessary.
Devolution to user departments most or all deci
sion making authority over procurements, system de
velopment and maintenance, priority setting, system
use accounting, and quality control. Enforcement
of organizational expectations about productivity
resulting from user-based computing activities
would be through normal merit review and monitor
ing of departmental computing activities.
LOCATION
Establishment of one (or very few) consolidated
facilities for provision of. cumiiutinq resources
and services. Including processing, storage, major
peripherals, and physical environments (e,g., ter
minal rooms, tape storage).
Allow users access to these resources and ser
vices through remote terminals and RJC equipment.
Installed ami aialntalnnd by the central facility,
and maintain contacts with users for service re
quests by establishing apprnprlate mechanisms
(e.g., assigning 'account manaqers* to different
user groups to deal with user needs and prnhlims.
Consolidation of major computing resources (e.g.,
large and expensive equl|ment, data bases, network
facilities) Into one or very few centers, and make
tliese available to users through remote access
equipment.
Allow users to create their own faclltles for
sauller-scale, department-related coaputlng acti
vity. Maintain overslglit of the scale of user op
erations to ensure against extensive duplication
and waste. Establish, where appropriate, network
ing among central and user facilities to allow
transfer'of data and files, and sharing nf re
sources.
Devolving to users the right to establish their own
computing facilities where they choose to do so.
Require users to utilize centralized facilities
only wlien necessary to meet organization-wide needs
when these neeils cannot be met through use of net
working.
FUNCTION
Consolidation of all major coaputlng functions
(e.g., hardware operations, systems and applica
tions programming, telecommunlcatlns, quality con
trol, documentation, maintenance, and systems man
agement) Into one or very few centers, co-lncated
with the centrallied facility. Require depart
ments to conform to central protocols for use of
these functional resources. Training nf users done
by the central Iced resource.
Allow users to manage only those computer-related
functions directly related to their departmental
activities (e.g., data entry). Allow user parti
cipation In system design. Have users evaluate
the service provided by the centralized functions.
Consolidation of major functions (I.e,, highly spe
cialized or expensive functions) such as sytems
programing, telecommunications management, data
base management, network management, or quality
control. These might he consolidated In a *pnnl*
arrangement provided by a major facility, or as a
staff function of upper management.
Allow users to acquire their own functional capa
bilities, for department-related needs such as ap
plications programxlng and. local data base manage
ment, Users manage and maintain their local faci
lities.
Devolution to users the authority to establish
their own functional resource centers, and permit
total user control over fitting the activities of
those resource-providers Into departmental opera
tions. Users provide for their nwn facility man
agement, quality control, and training, though
perhaps through contractual deals with other de
partments.
